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Central  securities  depositories  (CSDs)  have  opened  mutual  links,  but  most  of 
them are seldom used. Why are idle links established? By allowing a foreign CSD 
to  offer  services  through  the  link  the  domestic  CSD  invites  competition.  The 
domestic CSD can determine the cost efficiency of the rival by charging suitable 
fees, and prevent it from becoming more competitive than the domestic CSD. By 
inviting  the  competitor  the  domestic  CSD  can  commit  itself  not  to  charge 
monopoly fees for secondary market services. This enables the domestic CSD to 
charge high fees in the primary market without violating investors’ participation 
constraints. 
 
Keywords: securities settlement systems, central securities depositories, network 
industries, access pricing 
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Mutual links between central securities depositories (CSD) in different European 
countries have been opened up. A CSD can have an omnibus securities account 
with a foreign peer CSD. An omnibus account is one in which a member pools 
securities owned by its own customers. Thus, a domestic investor or investment 
firm can hold securities issued in another country on a domestic securities account 
with  the  domestic  CSD.  Securities  held  by  all  these  domestic  customers  are 
pooled  on  the  omnibus  account  of  the  domestic  CSD  with  the  foreign  CSD. 
Secondary market transactions in foreign securities can be processed through the
link and the domestic CSD.   
 
However, in the light of most of the available information, these links are seldom 
used. It is possible that these links have no potential for becoming an efficient 
way to channel cross-border transactions in securities. This might explain why 
these links are barely used; but why would idle links be established in the first 
place?   
 
This  paper  approaches  this  question  from  the  point  of  view  of  industrial 
organisation  theory.  CSDs  are  assumed  to  be  profit-maximising  national 
monopolies. They offer two kinds of services. First, they offer services related to 
issuance  of  new  securities.  At  a  later  stage,  they  offer  services  related  to 
secondary market transactions between investors. Because the monopoly cannot 
credibly commit itself to low future fees for secondary market transactions, the 
CSD must charge relatively low prices for primary market transactions. If it tried 
to abuse its monopoly power in the primary market, no securities would be issued 
in the system.  
 
It turns out that the link can be used as a tool that allows the CSD to charge higher 
fees  for  primary  market  transactions.  If  the  link  is  in  place,  at  least  foreign 
investors can make transactions in securities without using the CSD where the 
securities  have  been  originally  issued.  Thus,  the  CSD  has  disposed  of  its 
monopoly situation, and when investors decide whether to invest in securities in 
the primary market or not, they understand that future fees for secondary market 
transactions will be reasonable.  
 
Interestingly, the domestic CSD can determine the cost efficiency of the rival. The 
foreign CSD cannot process transactions with domestic securities without services 
offered by the domestic CSD. The domestic CSD can charge suitable fees, and 
prevent the foreign rival CSD from becoming more competitive than the domestic 
CSD. An ideal competitor is one competitive enough to prevent future monopoly 
pricing but not sufficiently competitive to capture the market. By inviting the 
competitor and by optimising its cost-efficiency the domestic CSD can commit 
itself not to charge monopoly fees for secondary market services without running 
the risk of losing customers. This enables the domestic CSD to charge high fees in 
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1.1  Securities settlement systems and links 
The key functions in securities markets are trading, clearing and settlement. In a 
trading system investors simply agree on buying and selling securities. This is of 
no  use  unless  the  trades  are  implemented.  Clearing  involves  verification  and 
matching of trades and calculation of the parties’ obligations. In the settlement 
process securities are transferred from seller to buyer and the payment from buyer 
to seller. 
  Securities settlement systems are essential market infrastructure institutions. 
In a typical modern system there is a central system in each country, or possibly 
several  systems  for  different  types  of  securities.  The  nature  of  the  settlement 
system may depend on the structure of the book-entry system. The central bank or 
state treasury may be a member, but most members are private companies in the 
financial industry, such as banks and investment firms, which participate in the 
central settlement system on behalf of their customers. In the following, these 
financial institutions are simply referred to as investment firms (IFs). 
  Paper-form securities have become rarities, having been largely replaced by 
book-entries, ie entries in a special securities account system. Many countries 
have a so-called ‘tiered’ book-entry system in which there is a central securities 
register at the central securities depository (CSD). Individual investors normally 
cannot  have  accounts  at  the  CSD.  The  central  register  consists  of  settlement 
system members’ accounts. Many, if not most, accounts are omnibus accounts. 
An omnibus account is an account in which a member holds pooled securities 
owned by its own customers. The CSD may know the total amounts of securities 
owned by the customers of each member, but may have no detailed information 
on individual investors’ holdings. The IF keeps detailed accounts on the holdings 
of individual customers in its own system. An account with such a custodian IF 
could also be an omnibus account; an IF without an account at the CSD can open 
an account with another IF and use it to pool the securities of its customers. Often 
such customer-IFs are foreign institutions. Investors face potentially significant 
switching costs in a tiered book-entry system because it is not possible to sell 
securities without using the services of the custodian CSD. 
  The official policy of the European Union is to enhance the integration of 
financial  markets.  The  EU  Commission  published  its  financial  services  action 
plan  (EU  1999)  a  few  years  ago.  The  plan  contained  several  proposals  on 
regulatory  changes  needed  to  speed  up  integration of the market for financial 
services.  Many  of  the  proposed  reforms  have  already  been  accomplished,  as 
concluded in the progress reports, but the market is still fragmented. There are 
more than 20 securities settlement systems in the EU area. Most of the centres are 
national  rather  than  international  institutions.  Cross-border  settlement  is  more 
cumbersome and costly than settlement at the national level (Giovannini et al 
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Leinonen 2003). 
  The interlinking of settlement systems is a potentially efficient way to avoid 
some of the problems. CSDs can open links between themselves. When such a 
link is opened the domestic CSD opens an omnibus account with the foreign CSD. 
Securities owned by domestic investors are pooled on this omnibus account. The 
domestic CSD keeps detailed records of the holdings of the clienteles of different 
domestic IFs, and the IFs arrange the accounting at investor level. Several links 
have already been established between CSDs in the EU area. 
  Unfortunately it is nearly impossible to find data on the use of these links, but 
many  industry  practitioners  claim  that  they  are  barely  used.  Why  do  CSDs 
establish such links even though financial institutions do not use them? It has been 
argued  that  the  links  are  not  a  competitive  alternative  because  of  legal 
uncertainties,  or  because  delivery-versus-payment  with  central  bank  money 
cannot be arranged through them. These shortcomings may be of importance, but 
they hardly constitute a credible explanation to the existence of idle links. Why do 
CSDs open such links if these links do not enable CSDs to offer services that 
would satisfy customer requirements? Is there any rational reason to do so? This 
paper is an attempt to present a potential explanation to the existence of idle links. 
It is proposed that an idle link with a peer CSD can help the CSD commit itself to 




1.2  The securities market as a network industry 
Telecommunications, power supply and payment systems are often classified as 
network industries. Shy (2001) presents a list of typical characteristics of network 
industries. 
 
–  Complementarity, compatibility and standards 
–  Externalities in consumption 
–  Switching costs and lock-in 
–  Significant economies of scale in production 
 
A national securities market infrastructure “silo”, consisting of trading, clearing 
and settlement systems, satisfies many of these criteria. Switching costs can be 
substantial,  especially  in  a  tiered  book-entry  system.  Because  investors  prefer 
more to less liquidity, there may be significant positive externalities at stake in 
investors’ decisions to “consume” services of the securities industry. There seem 
to be substantial economies of scale and scope in the stock exchange industry 
(Hasan  &  Malkamäki  2001),  and  notably  in  the  securities  settlement  industry 
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platform industries, ie service providers that need two kinds of customers who 
need to interact. If either of the customer types is missing, the other group will not 
be interested in the services offered by the company. For instance, a credit card 
company  needs  both  consumers  who  are  willing  to  pay  with  the  card  and 
merchants who are willing to accept them. To an extent, a national securities 
market infrastructure “silo” is a platform industry because it needs both investors 
and  issuers.  Competition  in  platform  industries  has  been  analysed  at  least  by 
Caillaud and Jullien (2001); in their model both types of customers can choose 
between the two “cybermediaries”. 
  In  many  cases  the  network  is  operated  by  a  monopoly,  although  other 
companies can provide services via the network. The owner of the network would 
normally charge a fee for such access. Laffont and Tirole (1994) presented one of 
the  first  analyses  of  access  pricing  in  a  network  industry.  In  their  model  a 
monopoly  both  operates  a  network  and  produces  services  that  are  supplied 
through it. Other companies can produce comparable services, but they cannot 
deliver them to customers without using the network controlled by the monopoly. 
Laffont  and  Tirole  focus  mainly  on  the  need  and  possibilities  to  regulate  the 
monopoly. 
  Even though the securities industry can be considered a network industry and 
securities  markets  are  of  paramount  importance  to  the  economy,  very  few 
analyses  have  been  done  that  treat  the  securities  market  infrastructure  as  a 
network industry. In his policy-oriented paper, Milne (2002) applies the access 
pricing regulation approach to CSDs. He concludes that the book-entry function 
and a few related services are a natural monopoly, at least at issuer level. On the 
other hand, CSDs offer a wide range of services that can be offered by competing 
firms if the CSDs do not prevent competition by abusing their control over the 
book-entry  system.  He  argues  that  certain  core  functions  should b e  l e f t  t o  a  
monopoly  whereas  competition  should  be  introduced  in  all other  clearing and 
settlement  related  services,  preferably  at  the  European  level.  A  regulation  on 
terms and pricing of access could be implemented to prevent abuse of CSDs’ 
monopoly position in potentially competitive operations. Although both Milne’s 
paper and the analysis of the sequel here apply the concepts of network industries 
to CSDs, the approaches are entirely different. No attention is paid here to the 
possibility of separating different CSD operations, and no attention is paid to the 
applicability of government regulations. 
 
 
1.3  Outline of the paper 
The  assumptions  of  the  basic  model  are  presented  in  the  section  2,  and  the 
solution of the model in the section 3. The model describes a world consisting of 
two identical countries. In each country there is a CSD and a large number of 
investment firms (IFs). Both countries are inhabited by one issuer and a large 
number of investors. Neither of the two issuers can use the foreign CSD. Neither 
9
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foreign  investments  must  be  channelled  through  a  custodian  IF  in  the  home 
country of the issuer. CSDs have monopoly power in respect of both securities 
issuance  in  the  primary  market  and  trade  among  investors  in  the  secondary 
market. There is no ordinary price elasticity of demand in the primary market if 
the fees are below the reservation level, implying that the monopoly power results 
only in a transfer of wealth to the CSD. The secondary market outcome cannot be 
Pareto  optimal  because  the  monopoly  CSD  faces  a  price  elastic  demand. 
Anticipated future welfare losses in the secondary market are reflected in the fees 
the CSDs can charge in the primary market. 
  The section 4 analyses how a CSD can increase its profit if it can commit 
itself to an optimal secondary market fee. This posted fee is lower than the fee 
without commitment, and, under certain conditions, approaches Pareto optimality. 
If the commitment is credible, the CSD can charge higher fees for primary market 
services without violating investors’ participation constraint. 
  In section 5 it is demonstrated that a link between two CSDs can be used as a 
strategic  commitment  to  the  optimal  secondary  market  posted  fee.  Because 
foreign  investors  can  transact  via  their  domestic  CSD  and  the  link,  there  is 
competition in the secondary market. A CSD can create a suitable competitor for 
itself by allowing the peer CSD to offer competing services. The ideal competitor 
should be competitive enough to convince would-be customers of the existence of 
competitive pressures but not competitive enough to capture the market. 
  The main results are reviewed in the conclusions section 6. Section 6 also 




2  Assumption of the basic model 
2.1  Agents 
There are two identical countries, 1 and 2, which are denoted i and j (i≠j). In each 
country there is a local securities infrastructure consisting of a national central 
securities  depository  (CSD)  and  a  large  number  of  identical  Investment  firms 
(IFs). All these undertakings try to maximise profits. 
  Each country has a large number of investors. These investors are divided into 
segments, which may be geographic regions or customer categories. There are n 
segments in each country. 
  The CSDs act as central securities registers. Each security issued in a CSD’s 
home country must be registered with that CSD. Each national CSD runs the 
central securities settlement system for domestic securities. The CSDs have no 
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securities portfolios of their own. 
  The  book-entry  system  is  tiered;  the  central  register  at  the  national  CSD 
consists of domestic IF’s omnibus accounts. Investors’ securities are pooled on 
these omnibus accounts. Investors and foreign IFs cannot open accounts with the 
CSD but they can open accounts with domestic IFs. If country j investors want to 
invest in securities of country i, they must open accounts with domestic country j 
IFs. Each IF in country j can open a securities account with a country i IF, and the 
securities are pooled in an omnibus account of this custodian IF. 
  Securities  are  traded  in  two  markets.  They  are  first  issued  in t h e  p r i m a r y  
market and thereafter traded in the secondary market. Secondary market trades 
between customers of different domestic IFs are settled at the CSD. 
  The IFs earn revenue by charging fees for the settlement services, ie unit 
prices per settled security. Each IF sets two secondary market prices to be paid by 
investors, one for a settlement order for a domestic security and another for a 
settlement order with a foreign security. The fee paid by a country i investor for a 
transaction in a domestic security is denoted wii and the fee paid for a transaction 
in a foreign (country j) security is denoted wij. Each IF also sets two unit fees for 
primary  market  transactions,  one  for  a  domestic  (country  i)  security  (γii)  and 
another  for  a  foreign  (country  j)  security  (γij) .  T h e r e  i s  f r e e  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  I F  
industry  and  the  market  is  highly  contestable;  no  IF  can  make  profits  in  the 
equilibrium. 
  There is one would-be issuer in each country.
1 The issuer must either use the 
domestic CSD or abstain from issuing securities. In real life issuers can often 
choose between CSDs of different nationalities, but using a foreign CSD can be 
particularly difficult and costly. For instance, if a corporation that is to be publicly 
quoted wants to issue its shares in a foreign system it should establish a holding 
company in the desired country and put all the operative units  under the new 
holding company, which would then be quoted on the stock exchange, instead of 
the former parent company. 




                                                
Investor behaviour 
Investors have a utility or objective function. No IF can successfully offer services 
to  more  than  one  segment,  and  no  investor  can  use  an  IF  based  in  another 
segment. As to functional forms and parameter values, the segments are identical. 
  Investors get utility from four sources: 1) from holdig domestic securities 
after issuance, 2) from holding foreign securities after issuance, 3) from trading in 
domestic securities in the secondary market, 4) from trading in foreign securities 
 
1  If  one  assumes  that  there  are  several  identical  issuers  in  each  country  the  model  becomes 
somewhat more complicated, but this would probably not lead to any essentially different results. 
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simply the sum of utilities from the four sources. 
  When securities are issued, each segment buys a given number of domestic 
securities and the same number of foreign securities. These quantities of securities 
are exogenous and are normalised to one domestic and one foreign security. 
  Each  domestic  investor  segment  in  country  i  is  willing  to  buy  domestic 
securities in the primary market if the following participation condition holds 
 
0 F U ii ii ≥ γ − +   (2.1) 
 
F is the net utility from holding domestic securities, defined  as the difference 
between gross utility and the fee paid to the issuer in the primary market. Uii is the 
anticipated net utility  from trading in securities in the secondary market. 
  Secondary  market  trading  takes  place  in  several  rounds.  Each  investor 
segment realises a need to trade in securities in the secondary market during each 
of these rounds. Either the segment sells a part of the securities portfolio or it 
invests more in the same asset. The sign of a segment’s transaction can change 
from round to round. Deals agreed in different rounds cannot be netted in the 
settlement system. If a segment buys now and sells at a later stage, the two deals 
must be settled separately. All  investors of a given segment are identical, and 
they always make similar secondary market transactions. 
  The utility of each domestic investor segment from trading securities in the 




ii 2 ii 1 ii w b b U θ − θ − θ =   (2.2) 
 
θii is the total number of securities traded in the secondary market during all the 
rounds,  and  the  b’s  are  exogenous  parameters  of  the  utility  function.  The 
parameter  b1  describes  investors’  willingness  to  trade,  and  the  parameter  b2 
indicates the rate at which this need is satiated. θii ≥ 0; θii may be greater than +1. 
If there were only one round of secondary market trading the analysis should be 
restricted to cases where θii < 1. An investor who holds m securities cannot sell 
m+1 securities without buying more of the same asset. If there are several rounds, 
it is possible that an investor segment sells more securities than it has bought in 
the primary market because the segment can buy more of the asset between two 
sales. 
  Secondary market trading (θii) is the investors’ decision variable at this stage. 
Secondary market trading affects investors’ utility in the same way irrespective of 
whether it satisfies the need to sell or to buy. In the light of empirical evidence, 
transaction costs reduce the volume of securities trading, but they do not seem to 
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Each foreign investor segment in country j is willing to buy securities issued in 
foreign country i if the following condition holds: 
 
0 F U ji ji ≥ γ − +   (2.3) 
 
where γji is the fee charged by country j IFs for primary market transactions with 
country i securities and Uji is the net utility (after transaction costs) of investors 
from secondary market trading. The net utility from holding foreign securities 
after issuance (F) equals the net utility from domestic securities. The utility from 




ji 2 ji 1 ji w b b U θ − θ − θ =   (2.4) 
 
Basically there is no difference between this function and function (2.2), except 
t h a t  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  w  m a y  d i f f e r ,  l e a d i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  v o l u m e s  o f  trading  and 
different levels of utility. 
  These utility functions are not directly derived from any portfolio allocation 
theory, but they predict behaviour not inconsistent with, say, the CAPM. Investors 
prefer to diversify across countries unless the transaction costs are too high. The 
willingness to trade in the secondary market could be due to, say, fluctuations in 
income and variations in consumption possibilities. 
 
 
2.3  Cross-border settlement 
There is no competition between IFs based in different countries. Investors cannot 
use services offered by foreign IFs. When they trade in foreign securities, they use 
a domestic IF. When IFs compete for domestic customers’ transactions in foreign 
securities the market is segmented exactly as the market for services in domestic 
securities. 
  No IF can become a settlement member at the foreign CSD. Foreign IFs must 
participate through a local custodian IF. Each IF in country i  has an omnibus 
account at a local IF in foreign country j. Any IF in country j can act as such a 
custodian. Strictly speaking, all the IFs in the model are custodians because all of 
them keep customers’ securities, but here the term “custodian IF” refers to an IF 
with  foreign  customers.  Because  remote  access  to  settlement  systems  is  not 
particularly commonplace in real life (see Giovannini & al, p. 8) whereas remote 
access to trading is, one could not readily interpret this model as a description of 
trading systems. 
  If an IF in country j decides to offer custodial services to foreign IFs, it sets 
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transaction  is  denoted  γjf  ,  where  j  denotes  the  country  and  f  customers’ 
foreign nationality. 
–  The unit fee per secondary market transaction to be paid by IFs in country i to 
the custodian IF in country j is denoted νj. The market for services to be 
offered to foreign IFs is not segmented. 
 
Investors and IFs have no preferences concerning would-be custodian IFs. If one 
of them charges lower fees than its rivals, it gets all the customers. 
  Securities are settled on a net basis at the CSD. The law of large numbers 
implies economies of scale in custodial operations. If the orders from different 
investor segments were of equal magnitude and completely non-correlated, the 
expected value of the absolute value of the number of securities to be settled with 
the CSD would grow linearly with the square root of the number of segments. 
However, sales and purchases by different investors cannot be independent draws 
from the same distribution because they must sum to zero. Every sale is matched 
by a purchase. In any case, a large and diverse customer base helps the custodian 
IF  to  economise  in  relative  terms  on  secondary  market  fees  paid t o  t h e  C S D  
because the expected value of securities to be settled at the CSD grows less than 
proportionately with the amount of customers. When one domestic segment and 
all foreign IFs use the same custodian IF, the net volume of orders the IF must 
settle with the CSD is x(nθji + θii), where x is a netting parameter (0 < x < 1). 
 
 
2.4  Costs 
The CSD i has operational costs c per processed security. The same parameter 
applies to both primary and secondary market transactions. Registering a security 
on the account of an IF in the primary market costs c. The cost of increasing or 
decreasing  by  one  the  number  of  securities  on  the  account  of  an I F  i n  t h e  
secondary markets is also c. Internalised trades, ie trades settled at IF level, are 
cost-free to the CSD. The CSD may have some fixed costs, which would imply 
economies of scale, but because these fixed costs are not reflected in optimal 
pricing, they can be ignored in the model.
2 
  The IFs of country j incur four kinds of costs: 
 
1.  Fees charged by the domestic CSD. 
2.  Fees paid to a foreign custodian IF. The fee for secondary market transactions 
is νi times the number of  foreign securities settled. The unit fee for primary 
market transactions is γif
                                                




2 Previous empirical research suggests that there are significant economies of scale in the securities 
settlement industry. (Schmiedel, Malkamäki & Tarkka 2002). This could mean that assuming the 
existence of fixed costs would be realistic. 
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mediated securities. The cost parameter c is the same as for the CSD. 
4.  Operational costs in the secondary market. The cost of services in domestic 
securities  equals  c  times  the  number  of  domestic  securities  settled  in  the 
secondary market. The cost is the same irrespective of whether the customer 
is an investor or another IF. When a custodian IF settles a security internally 
between the accounts of two customer IFs, the cost is c per customer IF. The 
cost of services in foreign securities is c times the number of settled securities. 
 
Because the same c parameter applies to all the IFs and to both CSDs, there are no 
differences in the cost efficiency of different institutions. As will be seen, there 
are no meaningful equilibria for secondary market trading unless b1 > 2c. 
  Neither IFs nor CSDs incur costs in secondary markets if securities are simply 
held in an account and no transacting takes place. 
  Because  there  are  no  synergies  between  services  related  to  foreign  and 
domestic securities, there could be many kinds of IFs. An IF may offer customer 
services for both foreign and domestic securities. Another IF may offer services 
for domestic securities only, or specialise in foreign securities and not offer any 
services for domestic securities. The most realistic interpretation of the model 
may be that there is only one IF in each segment, which offers services for both 
domestic and foreign securities. However, no such assumption is necessary. 
 
 
2.5  Fees collected by the CSDs 
The IFs have to pay the CSD a unit fee for each security issued in its central book-
entry register. There are two primary market fees in the model. αi is the fee paid 
by  a  custodian  IF  with  foreign  customers  and  βi  the  fee  paid  by  an  IF  with 
domestic customers only. In a typical real life situation the CSD cannot make any 
of  its  fees  directly  conditional  on  the  nationality  of  the  customers  of  the  IF. 
However, the CSD could create indirect ways to price discriminate. The CSD 
could charge a certain fee per security if the number of securities on the account 
does not exceed the number of securities bought by one segment, and another fee 
if the number of securities exceeds this ceiling. To a large extent this objective 
can be achieved by charging a separate fee for opening the account. 
  If it were assumed that the issuers pay an important part of the fee, nothing 
essential would change in the model outcomes. The fee would be reflected in the 
minimum primary market price required by issuers, and the fee burden would be 
passed on to investors. Now, instead, IFs and investors pay the fee in a more 
direct way. As to real life interpretations, these primary market fees may include a 
number  of  different  fees,  especially  fees  for  the  primary  market  transactions 
themselves. They might also include fees paid by issuers on a monthly basis and 
fees paid by IFs for having an omnibus account with the CSD. The common 
denominator of these kinds of fees is that they cannot be avoided by not trading in 
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themselves to paying them at an early stage. 
  Pricing in the secondary market is simple. The CSD can charge a constant 
unit fee for each security settled at the CSD. The fee charged by CSD j and paid by
the IF is denoted pj. This fee is the same, irrespective of the customer’s nationality.
If an IF internalises trades, ie settles them between two customers in its own system, 
the CSD cannot charge any fees. 
 
 
2.6  Order of moves 
Events happen in the following order. 
 
1)  CSDs set the primary market fees (αs and βs). 
2)  Issuers and investors agree or do not agree on primary market transactions. 
3)  CSDs set the secondary market fees (p’s). 
4)  IFs set their fees (w’s, ν’s and γ’s). 
5)  Investors choose IFs. 
6)  Securities are issued, secondary market trades are agreed, cleared and settled. 
 
This is a full information game. All the agents can immediately observe all the 
others’ decisions. The only thing that cannot be calculated beforehand is the sign 
of transactions of different investor segments at the 6
th stage, even though it is 




3  Solving the model 
3.1  Secondary market trading volumes 
Investors have only one optimisation decision to make in the secondary market, 
namely the number of securities to buy or sell. The sign of the transaction, ie 
whether they sell or buy, is determined by exogenous factors not analysed in this 
model. At this stage the costs of primary market transactions are sunk costs and 
are  completely  irrelevant  to decision making. Domestic and foreign investors’ 
optimisation conditions can be derived by differentiating formulas (2.1) and (2.3), 






= θ ∂ ∂
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extreme  values  are  maxima.  These  conditions  yield  the  following  unique 
solutions: 





2 < − = θ ∂ ∂ = θ ∂ ∂
 
[] [ ] [ ] [ ] 2 ji 1 ji 2 ii 1 ii b 2 / w b b 2 / w b − = θ − = θ   (3.1) 
 
Unsurprisingly,  the  willingness  to  trade  (b1)  increases  the  volume  of  turnover 
whereas the rate at which the need is satiated (b2) diminishes it. In any meaningful 
equilibrium  with  secondary  market  trading  by  both  domestic  and  foreign 
investors, b1 > wji and b1 > wii. If these conditions were not satisfied the marginal 
cost of trading would exceed the marginal benefit with any non-negative amount 
of secondary market trading. 
 
 
3.2  Competition between IFs 
3.2.1  Domestic securities and domestic customers 
If there is only one IF in the segment, and if the IF has no foreign customers, it 
earns the following profit from services with domestic securities. 
 
0 ) c p w ( ) c ( ii i ii i ii = θ − − + − β − γ   (3.2) 
 
where  (γii – βi – c)  is  the  profit  from  primary  market  transactions  and  
(wii – pi – c)θii the profit from secondary market transactions. 
  If there are several IFs in the segment, both the revenues and the costs are 
multiplied by the market share, and the existence of multiple IFs has no impact on 
prices. Because the IF has no market power it must charge fees equal to marginal 
costs. The fee paid by domestic investors for domestic securities is 
 
c i ii + β = γ   (3.3) 
 
With secondary market services the zero profit condition can be written as 
 
c p w 0 c p w i ii ii ii i ii ii + = ⇒ = θ − θ − θ   (3.4) 
 
These prices remain unchanged if there are multiple IFs in each segment; all the 
revenues and expenditures in the zero profit constraint (3.2) are simply multiplied 
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There are no synergies between services with foreign and domestic securities. 
Therefore  the  fees  for  services  with  foreign  securities  can  be  analysed 
independently of the fees for services with domestic securities. Because of free 
entry and constant returns to scale no IF can make profits in the equilibrium. The 
profit of an IF offering nothing but services with foreign securities, if it is the only 
incumbent IF in the segment, is 
 
0 ) c w ( c ji i ji if ji = θ ν − − + − γ − γ   (3.5) 
 
Because of a lack of market power, the marginal cost of each service must equal 
the marginal cost. As to services with primary market transactions, the zero profit 
condition yields 
 
0 c 0 c if ji if ji = + γ = γ ⇒ = − γ − γ   (3.6) 
 
In secondary market operations the zero profit constraint of a  country j IF in 
mediating country i securities can be written as 
 
c w 0 ) c w ( i ji ji i ji + ν = ⇒ = θ ν − −   (3.7) 
 
These prices remain unchanged if there are multiple IFs in each segment; all the 
revenues and expenditures in the zero profit constraint (3.5) are simply multiplied 
by the market share. 
 
 
3.2.3  Pricing by the custodian IF 
When the would-be custodian IFs compete for settlement orders from abroad, the 
market  is  not  segmented,  and  all  the  IFs  compete  among  themselves.  The 
possibilities to internalise trades in the secondary market cause increasing returns 
to scale, which implies that Bertrand competition with identical services leads to a 
situation where there is only one custodian IF that actually enters the market. This 
outcome has some analogies with the result of Yanelle (1989); if the supply of 
deposits is limited, and if Bertrand competing banks are subject to increasing 
returns to scale, there will be only one bank with a positive market share, but it 
cannot make profits. 
  Basically any of the IFs could be the one that captures the market. No IF 
would be able to cover its costs in the highly contestable business if it operated 
with a volume that does not minimise average costs. Any rival IF could undercut 
its  prices  by  operating  at  the  optimal  scale.  The  zero  profit  constraint  of  the 
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0 ) c w ( p ) n ( x ) c ( n ii ii i ii ji ji i = θ − + θ + θ − θ − ν   (3.8) 
 
Obviously there are several combinations of νi and wii satisfying this zero profit 
constraint (3.8). However, there is only one combination that cannot be profitably 
undercut by a rival IF, namely the one where the fee for domestic services is 
determined  according  to  equation  (3.4).  If  the  IF  charges  a  higher  fee  for 
transactions coming from abroad (νi) and a lower fee for domestic transactions, 
any  IF  of  another  market  segment  could  undercut  the  fee  for  cross-border 
transactions, keep its fee for domestic transactions unchanged and make a positive 
profit. If the custodian IF tried to charge a lower fee for transactions from abroad 
(νi) and a higher fee for transactions from the home market, another would-be IF 
of the same segment would undercut with a lower wii and get all the customers of 
the segment. 
  When wii is determined according to (3.4), wji according to (3.7) and the θ’s 








i 1 i 1
i
+ − + + − + − − + − − + − +
= ν
  (3.9) 
 
With a very large number of segments this result can be approximated as 
 
c xp Lim i i n + = ν
∞ →   (3.10) 
 
The fee equals the cost, which is intuitive in a highly contestable industry. 
  The profit from primary market operations is 
 
γii + n*γif – (n+1)*c – (n+1)*αi = 0. 
 
Because γii is determined according to (3.3), this yields 
 
(βi+c) + n*γif – (n+1)*c – (n+1)*αi = 0 
 
n / ) cn n ( i i i if + α + β − α = γ ⇒   (3.11) 
                                                 
3  Strictly  speaking  there  is  another  value  of  νi  that  satisfies  the  condition  (3.8),  at  least  in 
mathematical terms, namely  




However, this higher value has no meaningful interpretation. It implies zero profits because the fee 
would imply a very small or even negative turnover. If x = 1, it implies θji = 0. If there is no 
turnover, there is no revenue and no costs, and the profit is zero. It would be easy for any IF to 
undercut this fee. Any fee between the two values of νi that satisfy the (3.8) would imply positive 
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3.3  Pricing by the CSDs 
3.3.1  Prices for secondary market services 
When  the  CSD  actually  chooses  the  secondary  market  fee  (pi)  investors’ 
participation constraint has become irrelevant because the decision to participate 
in  the  primary  market  has  already  been  made.  Instead,  the  price  elasticity  of 
demand prevents the CSD from charging infinitely high prices. At the secondary 
market  stage  the  CSDs  decide  nothing  but  the  fee  for  secondary  market 
transactions. 
  Because there are n segments in each country, and because one segment of the 
domestic  country  makes  transactions  through  the  custodian  IF,  there  are  n+1 
segments  making  transactions  through  the  custodian  IF  and  n–1  making 
transactions through other IFs. The total volume of secondary market transactions 
by foreign segments equals n*θji, the volume of secondary market transactions by 
each domestic segment is θii, the net amount of secondary market transactions to 
be settled at the CSD is x(n*θji + θii). For each transaction settled at the CSD, be it 
a secondary or primary market transaction, the CSD incurs the cost c. Hence, the 
profit of CSD i is 
 
) c )( 1 n ( ) c )( 1 n ( ) c p )( n ( x ) c p )( 1 n ( i i i ii ji ii i i − β − + − α + + − θ + θ + θ − − = Π   (3.12) 
 
and the optimisation condition is 
 
0 p / i i = ∂ Π ∂   (3.13) 
 
PROPOSITION 1. The secondary market fee is higher than the marginal cost 
(pi > c) 
 
When pi = c, differentiating the profit expression (3.12) with respect to pi yields 
 
0 ) * n ( x * ) 1 n (
0 0 ) 0 ( * } p / ) p / ( n { x
1 ) * n ( x ) p / ( * ) 0 ( * ) 1 n ( * 1 * ) 1 n (
p /
ii ji ii
i ii i ii
ii ji i ii ii
i i
> θ + θ + θ − =
= + + ∂ θ ∂ + ∂ θ ∂ +
+ θ + θ + ∂ θ ∂ − + θ − =
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price (∂Πi/∂pi > 0). Therefore it would be optimal to increase the price so that 





Basically this result is rather trivial. Both CSDs are pure monopolies because no 
other institution can offer CSD services with domestic securities. Each CSD has 
monopoly  power,  and  there  is  no  reason  not  to  use  it.  Hence,  CSDs  charge 
monopoly prices, and these prices are higher than the marginal cost. The result is 
not limited to very large values of n (n >> 0). It goes without saying that this 




3.3.2  Prices for primary market services 
The CSDs have a pure monopoly position in the primary market. Because there is 
no competition in the primary market, it is rational to set the fee at the reservation 
level. 
  At this stage the CSDs have no possibilities to commit themselves to any 
particular future secondary market pricing policy. The only decision variables are 
αi a n d  βi.  Investors  understand  that  the  secondary  market  fee  (pi)  will  be 
determined at a later stage according to condition (3.13). Whatever the CSDs do 
at  the  primary  market  stage,  they  cannot  convince  investors  abou t  a n y  o t h e r  
secondary  market  pricing  policies.  Primary  market  prices  do  not a f f e c t  p r o f i t  
maximising secondary market prices because d
2Πi/dpidαi = 0 and d
2Πi/dpidβi = 0. 
Utilities from secondary market trading (Us) do not depend on primary market 
fees, and they can be considered as exogenous constants at this stage. 
  When  primary  market  fees  of  IFs  are  determined  according  to  (3.6)  and 
(3.11), the participation constraint of foreign investors (2.3) can be rewritten 
 
0 n / ) cn 2 n ( F U 0 F U i i i ji ji ji ≥ + α + β − α − + ⇔ ≥ γ − +   (3.14) 
 
And the participation constraint of domestic investors (2.1), when the primary 
market fee is determined according to (3.3), can be rewritten 
 
0 ) c ( F U 0 F U i ii ii ii ≥ + β − + ⇔ ≥ γ − +   (3.15) 
 
The CSD has no reason not to charge the highest prices that do not violate the 
participation constraints (3.14) and (3.15) of foreign and domestic investors. It 
follows that 
 
c U F ) 1 n /( ] nU U ) n 2 1 ( c Fn F [ ii i ji ii i − + = β + + + + − + = α   (3.16) 
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where  the  Us  are  determined  by  the  formulas  (2.2)  and  (2.4)  and  anticipated 
secondary market fee (pi), which is higher than the cost (c). For most parameter 
values, αi < βi. 
 
 
4  Commitment to profit maximising pricing 
4.1  Assumptions 
In section 3 the CSDs could not pre-commit themselves to any secondary market 
fees. The only way to convince investors that buying securities in the primary 
market is reasonable was to set primary market fees low enough to guarantee a 
non-negative total net utility even when the CSD sets its secondary market prices 
at the monopoly level. 
  A  new  concept,  the  posted  fee  ( ),  is  now  introduced  to  facilitate  the 
analysis.  The  posted  fee  is  the  profit  maximising  secondary  market  fee  for  a 
transaction  in  domestic  securities  when  the  CSD  can  commit  itself  to  it  in  a 
credible and observable way before investors make any decisions. Both CSDs 




–  The CSD cannot commit itself to the posted fee. In this case the posted fee is 
completely  irrelevant,  it  will  not  be implemented at the secondary market 
stage, investors pay no attention to it, and it has no effect on anything. 
–  The  CSD  can  commit  itself  to  the  posted  fee.  Investors’  participation 
decisions depend on it because a lower fee increases investors’ willingness to 
participate.  In  this  case  feasible  primary  market  fees  can  be  expressed  as 




Events happen in the following order 
 
1.  Both CSDs choose the posted fee to be charged in the secondary market ( )  
*
i p
2.  CSDs set the primary market fees (αs and βs). 
3.  Issuers and investors make a binding commitment either to issue securities or 
not to issue. 
4.  CSDs set the secondary market fees (p’s). If the CSD has made a binding 
commitment, the fee must equal the posted fee (pi =  )  
*
i p
5.  IFs decide whether or not to enter the market. IFs set their fees (w’s, ν’s and 
γ’s). 
6.  Investors choose IFs. 
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4.2  Solving the model 
Let us assume the CSD can make a binding commitment to the posted fee. How 
high or low should the fee be to maximise profits? 
 
PROPOSITION 2 If the CSD can commit itself to pi =  , profit maximisation 
of CSD i implies p
*
i p
i ≈ c if n >> 0. 
 
PROOF 
If n >> 0 result (3.10) implies that the following holds as an approximation; 
 
wji = νi + c + h = xpi + 2c. 
 
θii and θji are determined according to (3.1). wii is determined according to (3.4), 
and wji according to the above result. 
  The primary market fees αi and βii can be expressed as functions of the posted 
secondary market fee,  . The highest possible and therefore profit maximising 




βii = F + Uii – c 
 
When n >> 0, αi can be approximated as αi = F + Uji – 2c 
  The profit Πi is determined according to (3.12). The optimal posted fee ( )  
satisfies  the  following  condition  when  all  these  indirect  effect s  a r e  t a k e n  i n t o  
account, including the total impact of   on θs (determined according to 3.1) and 





i and βi. 
 
imum max 0 ] b 2 /[ ] ) x 1 ( ) x 1 ( n [ dp / d
c p Lim
) nx x x 2 1 n /( )} nx x 2 1 n ( c { p
0 dp / d
2









⇒ < − + + − = Π
= ⇒








This result differs from proposition 1 because causalities between Us and primary 
market fees differ. In the basic model the actual secondary market fee and primary 
market fees were not related at all. When the CSD set the fee, it was too late to 
affect the participation decision. Now, it is assumed that investors’ decisions are 
de facto based on the actual secondary market fee. The CSDs cannot ignore the 
impact of the secondary market fee on participation decisions. The impact of the 
actual fee on feasible primary market fees must be taken into account. 
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commitment to the optimal posted fee  . The CSD would make no profits in 




  Interestingly, if the number of segments is very large, the CSDs’ secondary 
market services are priced at marginal cost. According to standard microeconomic 
theory this is socially optimal. This result is clearly intuitive. If the CSD has 
committed itself to price at the marginal cost in the secondary market, it utilises 
its market power in the primary market only. In this market such monopoly power 
implies nothing but a harmless transfer of wealth from investors to shareholders of 
the CSD. Hence, the CSDs can introduce a Pareto improvement and capture all 
the benefits themselves. 
  Because  the  custodian  IF  has  a  handful  of  domestic  customers,  the  CSD 
cannot be a perfect price discriminator between domestic and foreign customers. 
Hence, the result on Pareto optimality holds as a mere approximation with large 
numbers  of  investor  segments.  When  the  number  of  segments  increases,  the 
relative importance of the domestic investor segment in the total clientele of the 
custodian IF gradually diminishes. 
 
 
5  An idle link as a commitment 
5.1  Assumptions 
The analysis of the section 4 is completely irrelevant unless the CSDs can commit 
themselves  to  the  profit  maximising  posted  fee.  In  this  section  it  will  be 
demonstrated  that  two  linked  CSDs  can  help  each  other  to  make  such  a 
commitment. 
  In the absence of the link, the CSDs had completely non-related operations. 
They  neither  competed  nor  cooperated.  Now,  the  two  CSDs  agree  on  an 
arrangement that on the surface may seem to introduce competition. However, if 
one analyses the situation at a deeper level, it is an instrument of cooperation. 
  Each CSD opens an omnibus account with the other CSD. Both CSDs can 
offer custodial services to domestic IFs and their customers. When the customers 
of domestic IFs invest in foreign securities, the securities can be pooled on the 
omnibus account of the domestic CSD with the foreign CSD. However, IFs can 
also use a foreign custodian IF, if they prefer this option. Hence, there are two 
competing channels for cross-border transactions. When IFs have chosen which 
service  suppliers  they  will  use  in  the  primary  market,  they  cannot  use  the 
alternative channel in the secondary market because the book-entries cannot be 
freely transferred between the omnibus account of the foreign custodian IF and 
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Securities Depositories Association (ECSDA) includes a section of a very general 
nature on fees to be paid by the CSD whose customers’ securities are pooled on 
the omnibus account. Here, these fees between CSDs are modelled in a simplistic 
way. The two CSDs agree on the following pricing. There is nothing but a fee for 
each primary market transaction. Whenever an investor segment of country j buys 
securities issued in CSD i in the primary market and the securities are pooled on 
the omnibus account of CSD j with CSD i, CSD j must pay a constant unit access 
fee (ai) in the primary market to the CSD i. The access fees charged by the two 
CSDs may or may not differ. There is no fee for opening the account and no 
secondary market fee between CSDs. 
  CSDs  incur  costs  with  foreign  securities  in  both  primary  and  secondary 
markets. These costs equal those in the basic model. The cost of registering one 
foreign security on the omnibus account of an IF is c, and the cost of increasing or 
decreasing the number of securities on the account of an IF in  the secondary 
market is c times the number of securities. 
  The fees charged by a CSD can differ for domestic and foreign securities. The 
fee  charged to the custodian IF for a primary market transaction with domestic 
securities is now denoted αi. The fee charged to another domestic IF for a primary 
market transaction in a domestic security is βii. If the link is in use, domestic IFs 
can conduct primary market transactions in foreign country j securities through 
the domestic CSD, and they must pay a primary market fee βij for this service. 
The fee to be paid by IFs for secondary market transactions is denoted pii for a 
domestic (country i) security and pij for a foreign security. 
  The order of events is the same as in section 4.1. The access fee (ai) and the 
primary market custodian fee (βij) are chosen at the second stage simultaneously 
with  the  primary  market  fees  for  domestic  securities  (αi,  βii).  The  fee  for  a 
secondary market transaction in a foreign security is chosen at stage 4. IFs choose 
between the domestic CSD and the foreign custodian IF at stage 5. 
  Because this is an attempt to explain why links may benefit CSDs even when 
they are not in use, the detailed analysis is mainly restricted to cases where the 
link is not utilised. 
 
 
5.2  Solving the model 
When the link is in place, the two CSDs find themselves in a kind of Bertrand 
competition for transactions in securities registered in the country i. At the stage 4 
the decision variable of each CSD is the secondary market fee (p). The primary 
market access fees (a’s) and the primary market fees (αs and βs) have already 
been decided at stage 2. The domestic CSD i offers services to  country j IFs 
through  a  domestic  custodian  IF,  whereas  the  foreign  CSD  j  offers  services 
directly  to  its  local  IFs.  However,  this  competition  differs  from  the  standard 
Bertrand competition of economics textbooks. The CSD i offers services through 
the domestic custodian IF, not directly to the foreign IFs, whereas the CSD j 
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does not necessarily get the customers because the primary market fees (α’s and 
β’s)  affect  the  IFs’  choices  between  domestic  custodian  CSD  and  foreign 
custodian IF, and because the custodian IF in country i charges a price that would 
normally differ from pii. 
 




CSD i CSD j








IFs find themselves in an extremely competitive situation and they must choose 
the option that provides customers with more utility. They cannot charge fees that 
exceed costs. 
  Let us assume there is a fee (pji) that satisfies the following two conditions. 
 
–  The  price  enables  CSD  j  to  make  a  marginally  positive  profit  in  foreign 
securities if investors use the link. 
–  If IFs use the domestic CSD and the link, their customers get a marginally 
positive net utility from country i securities. 
 
How will the existence of such a potential fee affect investors’ decisions at the 
primary market stage? Interestingly, it will make country j investors willing to 
participate, even if the primary market fees (αs and βs) are higher than in the 
section 3. The reason is simple. The link eliminates the monopoly of the foreign 
CSD. If the link is in place, no secondary market price of CSD i (pii) would both 
lead to a negative total net utility for country j investors and be sustainable in the 
competitive situation. If the prices of CSD i were too high to  leave country j 
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make profits. Whatever CSD i does at the stage 4, it cannot force foreign investors 
to accept a negative net utility. It cannot practice monopoly pricing because it is 
not a monopoly. Hence, investors understand that the total net utility they get 
from participating cannot be negative, and they decide to buy securities in the 
primary market. 
  Is it possible for the CSDs to artificially construct a situation where CSD j can 
offer a price that satisfies the two above-mentioned conditions, but is unable to 
offer, without making losses, a price that would be even more competitive? 
  Let us assume country j IFs use domestic CSD j and the link to conduct 
transactions with country i securities. The secondary market fee (pji) that leaves 
investors with nothing but a marginally positive total net utility after trading costs 
satisfies condition (2.3). When (2.4) is substituted for Uji, the condition (2.3) can 
be written as 
 
ε = γ − + θ + − θ − θ ji ji ji
2
ji 2 ji 1 F * ) c p ( * b * b   (5.1) 
 
ε  is  an  arbitrarily  small  positive  constant.  Letting  ε = 0,  and  substituting 




) c F ( b * 2 c b p ji 2 1 ji + − β − − =   (5.2) 
 
If  βji ≥ F–c,  the  custodian  CSD  can  at  stage  4  extract  all  the  surpluses  from 
country j investors with a high secondary market fee and formula (5.2) has a real 
root. If the value of pji indicated by (5.2) is less than b1/2, which would be the 
unconstrained monopoly price
5, this is also the profit maximising value of pji. 
Lower fees would imply less revenue and higher fees would violate investors’ 
participation constraints. CSD j is free to choose at stage 2 a value of βji that 
satisfies both criteria, ie such that βji ≥ F – c and formula (5.2) will imply that 
pji
                                                
 < b1/2. If CSD j wants to participate in the mutually beneficial cooperation with 
the peer CSD, it must choose such a suitable primary market fee βji. If it does not, 
the peer CSD has no incentive to open the link. 
  CSD i can choose an access fee (ai) that leaves CSD j with nothing but a 
marginally positive profit from operations through the link even if CSD j charges 
 
4 M a t h e m a t i c a l l y  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  v a l u e s  o f  p ji  that  satisfy  the  condition  (5.1)  
pji = {b1 – c – 2*√[b2(βji – F + c)]} and pji = {b1 – c + 2*√[b2(βji – F + c)]}. However, the higher 
potential pji is not meaningful. It would imply negative secondary market turnover, which would 
make the term – (pji + c)*θji positive, as if customers could earn money by using negative amounts 
of expensive services. 
5 Surprisingly, the cost parameter c has no impact on the optimal monopoly price. The reason for 
this is simple. It has been assumed that IFs and CSDs have the same cost parameter. If IFs’ costs 
increase, the demand faced by the CSD weakens, which lowers the optimal price. This effect and 
the direct impact of own costs on the optimal fee by the CSD offset each other. 
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 427
January 2005the  highest  possible  secondary  market  price  (pji)  which  is  determined  by  the 
condition (5.2). When pji is determined according to condition (5.2), there is only 
one value of ai that will lead to zero profits from CSD j operations in country i 
securities. This value is determined as follows. 
 
0 } c ) c p ( a { n ji ji i ji = − θ − + − β  
 
When (3.1) is substituted for θji, (pji + c) for wji and (5.2) for pji, this yields 
 
2 ji 1 ji i b / ) F c ( ) c 2 b ( c 3 F 2 a − + β − + β − − = ⇔   (5.3) 
 
When the value of a i is marginally lower than the value indicated by formula 
(5.3), country j investors know that Bertrand competition in the secondary market 
cannot  lead  to  a  situation  where  investors’  total  net  utility  from  country  i 
securities will be negative. If CSD i tried to charge a secondary market price that 
leads to negative net utility, foreign IFs would choose CSD j and the link, because 
CSD j could earn profits by offering prices that would allow country j investors to 
achieve  a  higher  total  net  utility.  Therefore  country  j  investor s  d e c i d e  t o  
participate at stage 3. 
  However, because the access fee (a) has been optimised to enable CSD j to 
earn nothing but a marginally positive profit, Bertrand competition will lead to a 
situation where the link is not in use. In Bertrand competition between unequally 
matched  rivals,  the  cost  efficient  institution  gets  all  the  customers.  If  CSD  i 
charges a secondary market price that enables investors to get a marginally higher 
utility than what CSD j can do without making losses, it could earn a clear profit, 
not just a marginal one. Its cost efficiency has not been artificially handicapped. 
 
 
5.3  The link and the posted fee 
What does the analysis on pricing by two linked CSDs have to do with the posted 
fee  discussed  in  section  4?  Two  linked  CSDs  can  commit  themselves  in 
cooperation to the posted fees in the secondary market by opening the link and 
setting the prices according to the results presented in section 5.2. CSD j must set 
the  maximal  primary  market  fees  that  do  not  violate  domestic  and  foreign 
investors’  participation  constraints  when  ,  and  set  an  access  fee  (a
*
jj jj p p = j) 
according to (5.3). Moreover, it should set a suitable primary market fee βji so that 
formula (5.2) has a real root and implies a value of pji < b1/2; otherwise the peer 
CSD  might  not  be  willing  to  cooperate.  When  the  moment  to  set  secondary 
market prices comes, the peer CSD i would capture all the foreign customers if 
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imply less revenue. Therefore the commitment to   is credible. 
*
jj p
  The link will enable the CSD to earn a profit that would be unattainable if the 
link were not in place. By opening the link the CSD can itself create a suitable 
competitor. The competitor should be cost-efficient enough to convince sceptical 
would-be  customers  about  reasonable  future  secondary  market  fees,  but  not 
competitive enough to capture the market. The optimal combination of primary 
and secondary market fees would not be feasible without this limited competition. 
If there were no link, the CSD could not convince any investor that the future 
secondary market fee (pii) is not significantly higher than c. 
 
 
5.4  Alternative cases 
It has been proven that an idle link is better for CSDs than no link at all, but it has 
not been proven that there is no alternative that would enable CSDs to make even 
more  profits.  The  existence  of  significantly  better  cases  should  be  impossible 
because, at least with a large number of investor segments (n>>0), an idle link 
leads  to  a  Pareto  optimal  pricing  outcome  where  the  CSDs  capture  all  the 
surpluses. 
  Would  it  be  possible  to  construct  examples  where  the  link  is  in  use,  the 
outcome is Pareto optimal and all the surpluses are captured by the CSDs? In the 
light of the assumptions, the link is about as cost efficient as the custodian IF 
system,  and  no  substantial  improvement  in  overall  cost-efficiency  could  be 
achieved by channelling transactions through the link. Moreover, the CSDs might 
not be able to capture all the surpluses. An artificial handicap should be imposed 
on the CSD of the issuer’s home country, and this handicap should prevent it from 
covering its costs with secondary market fees that would enable investors to get 
substantially positive net utility. If there were no such handicap, the CSDs would 
continue price competition far beyond the point where investors’ participation 
constraint is satisfied. It might even be profitable to charge a fee that is lower than 
the cost (pii < c) if this enables the CSD to capture the market and collect fee 
revenue for primary market transactions. This would imply a transfer of wealth 
from CSDs to investors. It is difficult to imagine what such an artificial handicap 
could be. Perhaps the two CSDs could try to explicitly agree on secondary market 
prices  (p’s),  but  such  agreements  would  breach  antitrust  laws  in  most 
jurisdictions. It is certainly much simpler to impose an artificial handicap on the 
custodian CSD. 
  Moreover, it has not been proven that the link would actually be a credible 
commitment. Raising the fee in the secondary market significantly above the cost 
would induce foreign IFs to use the link, but domestic investors do not have this 
option.  Collecting  high  fees  in  the  secondary  market  from  domestic  investors 
might be a better strategy than collecting low fees from domestic and foreign 
customers  alike.  Moreover,  if  investments  come  via  the  link,  the  CSD  earns 
access fee revenue. If these effects dominate, the link will have no impact on 
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choose  posted  fees  at  stage  4.  The  credibility  of  the  link  as  a  commitment 
probably depends on the parameter values. If almost nothing can be netted at the 
custodian level (x ≈ 1), and if a very low value of b2 implies high volumes of 
secondary market trading, secondary market transactions via the custodian CSD 
will become an unwelcome economic burden that should be avoided. If F = 2c 
and  βji = c,  formula  (5.3)  implies  that  access  fees  paid  by  the  custodian  CSD 
cannot  compensate  for  the  loss  because  they  are  zero.  Moreover,  because  Uji 
increases  when  b2  decreases,  the  CSD  loses  substantial  amounts  of  primary 
market  fee  revenue  from  foreigners  (αi)  if  the  link  is  in  use.  At  least  with 





6  Conclusions 
6.1  Summary of main results 
This paper presents a model of the securities settlement industry, with primary 
focus being on cross-border settlement. There are two countries each inhabited by 
one issuer, a CSD, a large number of investment firms and a large number of 
investors.  Neither  issuer  can  use  the  foreign  CSD.  Transactions  in  foreign 
securities  must  be  channelled  through  a  custodian  investment  firm  in  issuer’s 
home  country.  CSDs  have  monopoly  power  in  both  primary  and  secondary 
markets. There is no ordinary price elasticity of demand in the primary market, 
only a simple reservation price, implying that the monopoly power causes nothing 
but a transfer of wealth to the CSD. This may be non-desirable from the point of 
view of distribution, but there is no misallocation of resources. The secondary 
market outcome, in contrast, cannot be Pareto optimal because the volume of 
transactions is price elastic and services are offered by a monopoly. Investors’ 
anticipated future welfare losses are reflected in the fees the CSDs can charge in 
the primary market. 
  Next, the impact of a link between the two CSDs is analysed. Because foreign 
investors can now make transactions through their domestic CSD and the link, 
there  is  competition  in  the  secondary  market,  even  though  the  competition  is 
limited to transactions by foreign investors. By allowing the peer CSD to offer 
competing services, a CSD can itself create a competitor. Unlike companies in 
ordinary industries, it has the possibility to choose the kind of competitor it will 
have. By charging a suitable access fee the CSD optimises the cost-efficiency of 
its rival. An ideal competitor will be cost-efficient enough to convince foreign 
would-be  customers  of  the  existence  of  adequate  competitive  pressures  in  the 
future but not efficient enough to capture the market. This enables the CSD to 
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all the benefits by charging high primary market fees. 
 
 
6.2  Comparison with previous literature 
  The model differs from many previous contributions on network industries 
and access fees because the two CSDs of the model are not competitors in the 
traditional meaning of the word. Neither of the CSDs could begin to compete with 
the  peer  CSD  on  its  own  initiative.  The  two  CSDs  offer  parallel  rather  than 
competing networks. The novelty of this paper is the use of a suitable access fee 
as  a  strategic  commitment  to  an  optimal  future  pricing  policy.  The  kind  of 
commitment described in this paper cannot be made unless customers choose the 
service  provider  before  they  choose  the  volume  of  services  to  consume.  The 
service provider is chosen before customers choose the volume of consumption in 
many other network industries, including mobile phone operators and credit card 
companies. Hence, the basic idea might be applicable to other industries. 
  Even  though  this  paper  presents  pioneering  work,  it  has,  at  least  on  the 
surface, certain analogies with previous contributions. 
  Economides  (1996)  has  presented  a  different  reason  why  a  company  in  a 
network industry might voluntarily invite competition. An exclusive holder of a 
technology  might  voluntarily  dispose  of  its  monopoly  position,  share  the 
technology and invite entry if it needs other companies to create the critical mass 
for  a  breakthrough.  The  argumentation  has  little  in  common  with  the  above 
analysis of CSDs. 
  Armstrong (1997) argued that competition could and should be introduced in 
the telecommunications industry in connections between networks, not within a 
customer base that currently uses the same service supplier. Maintaining the local 
network generates fixed costs. One of the few ways to acquire funding for these 
costs is to allow the network provider to use its monopoly power. Introducing 
multiple competing systems in interconnections between networks, instead, might 
be a sustainable Pareto improvement. In both the analysis of Armstrong and the 
above  model  of  CSDs,  the  Pareto  improvement  is  due  to  the  introduction  of 
competing channels between the two networks, which helps to abolish monopoly 
distortions in the allocation of resources. In this sense the models are very similar. 
However, in the Armstrong model customers benefit from intensified competition, 
not the companies themselves. 
  Crampes and Laffont (2001) present different results. They argue that in the 
case  of  the  electricity  industry,  it  is  not  particularly  important  to  prevent 
monopolist practices in the operations of international links. The main reason for 
this conclusion is that domestic and foreign electricity are perfect substitutes, and 
the market share of imported electricity is too marginal to enable the importer to 
abuse its market power. In the model presented above, the situation is entirely 
different because foreign and domestic securities are not substitutes. If investors’ 
objective functions were different, and if foreign and domestic securities were 
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CSDs would compete for investors even at the primary market stage. Opening the 
link would make it easier for investors to invest in foreign vs domestic securities, 
thereby intensifying competition between the two CSDs. This would probably be 
welfare improving. However, the CSDs might not be willing to open the link 
because competition would imply a transfer of wealth to investors. 
  In their analysis of competing platform industries, Caillaud and Jullien (2001) 
explicitly  model  access  and  usage  prices.  These  prices  can  be  compared  to 
primary and secondary market fees in the above model. However, the results of 
their analysis are not applicable to the situation analysed in here because in the 
model of Caillaud and Jullien both types of customers can choose between firms. 
  Unlike Milne (2002) this paper is based on a rather simplistic view of the role 
of the CSD. Milne proposes that, if necessary, government regulations should be 
introduced to enhance competition in non-core operations of CSDs. In this paper 
these  kinds  of  additional  services  are  not  explicitly  modelled.  If  they  were 
included in the formal model, the basic result of the potential use of the link as a 
strategic commitment might remain unchanged. 
  The results have clear analogies with some previous contributions that have 
analysed the pricing of captive products. Razors and razor blades can be used as 
an  example  of  this  kind  of  pricing  (Glick  &  Cameron  1999).  Manufacturers 
may  underprice razors and make them incompatible with other manufacturers' 
blades. Profits would be made by abusing the monopoly power in the market for 
blades.  Primary  market  transactions  in  the  above  model  are  the  equivalent  of 
razors and secondary market transactions the equivalent of blades. Establishing 




6.3  Discussion 
The model is based on the assumption that the CSDs maximise profits. In many 
countries CSDs are owned by their direct customers, mainly banks and investment 
firms. Does this imply that the assumption of profit maximisation is inappropriate, 
and  that  the  CSDs  try  above  all  to  provide  their  customers  with  inexpensive 
services? Interestingly, a jointly owned upstream supplier might  maximise  the 
wealth  of its shareholders by maximising its own profits, even  if this implies 
excessive monopoly prices imposed on shareholder-customers. If the shareholder-
customers  compete  fiercely  among  themselves,  they  cannot  make  any  profits 
themselves. Whatever the price of the intermediate good, it is reflected as such in 
the prices paid by end-customers. If the jointly owned supplier is able to earn 
monopoly profits, the surpluses can be shared among shareholders. This may be 
the  only  potential  source  of  pure  profits  for  the  shareholder-customers.  No 
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an implicit cartel. In many countries the securities industry satisfies many of the 
above-mentioned conditions. Typically there is only one CSD, one of the purest 
monopoly  situations  one  can  find.  The  CSD  is  often  owned  by  financial 
institutions, and competition between securities brokers seems to be tough. 
  The model has certain empirical predictions. If CSDs open links, they will 
increase fees that do not depend on the volume of secondary market trading, such 
as fees related to issuance, fees that depend on the number of securities on an 
account, fees for having an account with the CSD, and annual fees charged to 
issuers. Fees related to secondary market trading, in contrast, would be reduced. 
Unfortunately statistics on the relative shares of different sources of fee revenue 
are not readily available. It might be possible to compile some of these data using 
information published by CSDs themselves. One could try to complement this 
information with estimations based on price lists published by CSDs and data on 
turnover in securities markets. 
  The link is likely to be a credible commitment if a relatively large number of 
customers could opt for it. This alternative is available to foreign investors only. If 
foreign investors account for only a marginal part of the total flow of investments, 
it is difficult to convince anyone that the risk of losing these customers would 
somehow affect future secondary market pricing by the CSD. Hence, a logical 
conclusion is that the link is more likely to be a credible and therefore useful 
commitment if cross-border investors account for a very large share of the whole 
securities market. This empirical prediction is clear-cut; more idle links would be 
established if and when the volume of cross-border investments increased. This 
seems  to  accord  with  reality,  even  though  there  may  be  other  more  obvious 
explanations for the observation. 
  The  outcome  with  the  link  is  economically  efficient  in  the  sense  that  it 
approaches Pareto optimality. To a certain extent this result is due to the fact that 
the CSDs can price discriminate between IFs at the primary market stage. The 
result has clear analogies with the old finding that a monopoly behaves Pareto 
optimally if it is a first degree or perfect price-discriminator. Nevertheless, the 
main intuition of the argumentation does not depend on this detail. If it were 
assumed that the CSDs cannot price discriminate in the primary market between 
foreign and domestic investors, the link could still be used as a tool to introduce 
some competition. Its existence would convince investors as to reasonable future 
prices  for  secondary  market  services,  thereby  raising  the  price  that  could  be 
charged in the primary market. 
  The usefulness of an idle link as a strategic commitment may be questionable 
unless the two CSDs can commit themselves not to close it immediately when 
issuers  and  investors  have  agreed  on  primary  market  transactions.  In  light  of 
article 12 of the ECSDA model agreement, closing the link would be easy. Either 
party can terminate the contract at any time, by giving proper notice. If the link is 
closed, the CSD whose customers’ securities are pooled in the omnibus account 
must withdraw the securities. By making the period of notice long enough, the 
CSDs can commit themselves not to close the link immediately. Moreover, in a 
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say, such reputation problems could also limit the freedom of choosing suitable 
secondary  market  prices.  However,  the  link  certainly  does  not  weaken  the 
credibility that CSDs are not going to abuse their monopoly power in secondary 
market operations. 
  Moreover,  the  model  yields  some  policy  implications  concerning  possible 
price  regulations.  The  previous  economic  literature  includes  a  great  deal  of 
analysis on access fee regulation. The results of this paper can hardly be used as 
an argument in favour of any regulations of access fees between the two CSDs. 
The outcome with the link is almost Pareto optimal and it is unlikely that any 
government intervention would improve the situation. If the governments of the 
two countries are more interested in investors’ costs than in Pareto optimality, 
they could try to regulate the access fee. However, the CSDs might react by not 
opening the link. Opening the link under effective price regulations would make 
the CSDs compete. If the regulated price were much lower than the strategically 
optimised price analysed in the section 5 of this paper, competition would cause a 
transfer of wealth from CSDs to investors. 
  As  to  other  price  regulations,  the  existence  of  links  between  CSDs  might 
make it less useful to regulate secondary market prices. If the link is not in place, 
imposing the regulation on fees for secondary market transactions would, at least 
in light of this model, cause a Pareto improvement. Regulating primary market 
prices  may  not  be  advisable  because  it  could  cause  allocative  distortions, 
especially if the CSDs are linked. If the CSDs could no longer capture all the 
surpluses,  there  would  be  a  more  pronounced  disparity  between  allocative 
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